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1 Introduction
The development of socio-economic projection scenarios plays a central role in the
assessment of climate change impacts, as well as in the design of policy responses.
Scenario building facilitates the interdisciplinary research efforts that appear nec-
essary for understanding the feedback mechanisms between climate impacts and
socio-economic conditions. Recent proposals for climate research projection scenar-
ios build on defining matrix structures where the interplay of climate signals and
socio-economic developments is explicitly emphasized (see for example Van Vuuren
et al. (2012)). To the extent that they are a central determinant of adaptation and
mitigation, income developments appear as a particularly important component of
such projection exercises, as highlighted in Van Vuuren et al. (2014) and O’Neill et
al. (2014) for the case of the recent Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs).
The aim of this paper is to present a modelling framework to create scenarios for
GDP and GDP per capita that can be used as an input in integrated assessment
modelling and other climate research applications which require income per capita
projections in the very long run. Our projection model has several advantages that
make it particularly well suited to serve as an instrument in climate change impact
assessments at the global level. On the one hand, its underlying structure, based
on a standard macroeconomic production function with labour input differentiated
by age and education attainment level, is simple and easy to communicate. On
the other hand, since the GDP projections are driven by human capital dynamics
(defined as the change of population by sex, age and educational attainment), the
specification proposed can be combined with the population projections developed
in the context of the SSPs by KC and Lutz (2014) in a straightforward manner.
In addition to the population projection input, the model is calibrated by setting
assumptions on physical capital investment, cross-sectional convergence and the de-
velopments in technological progress which are not related to human capital. The
combination of the income projection method presented in this contribution with the
population projection instruments described in KC et al. (2010) and used in KC and
Lutz (2014) constitutes a self-contained and comprehensive framework to develop
quantitative scenarios for assessing long-run environmental challenges. As such, it
is thus designed to serve as a quantitative tool for assessing climate research ques-
tions related to the interplay of climate and socioeconomic systems. Furthermore,
the relative simplicity of the approach makes it particularly suited to be adapted to
other applications in social and environmental sciences.
From a theoretical point of view, the modelling strategy behind the projection exer-
cise proposed in this paper builds upon a broad literature which emphasizes the role
of human capital as a driver of economic growth (see for example Miller (1967) for
a discussion on the role of education as a driver of economic growth in the history
of economic thought). Early econometric contributions assessing the link between
educational attainment and economic growth using large samples of countries tend
to treat human capital as a standard input of production (see Mankiw et al. (1992))
whose accumulation affects income per capita in a similar fashion as physical capital
accumulation does in earlier exogenous models of economic growth. The effect of
education on labour productivity, a robust empirical stylized fact at the microeco-
nomic level, justifies such an approach. Moving away from such an interpretation
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as a production factor, several contributions recognize the central role played by
the stock of human capital (as opposed to the rate of accumulation) as a catalyst
of technological innovation and foreign technology adoption (see Nelson and Phelps
(1966) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)). In terms of model specification, such a
generalization of the theoretical setting leads to empirical specifications where the
stock of human capital and its interaction with the distance to the global tech-
nological frontier are used as explanatory covariates in addition to human capital
accumulation variables.
In spite of the empirical evidence supporting the link between education and income
at the macroeconomic level, very few contributions have used education as a basis
for long-run out-of-sample economic growth projections. The lack of comparable
data on educational attainment projections for broad sets of countries explains, at
least partly, this gap in the literature. The information contained in age-structured
population projections, which are available globally, has however been utilized to
construct income forecasts (see Bloom et al. (2007) or Lindh and Malmberg (2007)).
Recently, the availability of new global data of population by age, sex and edu-
cational attainment (see Lutz et al. (2007)) has enabled the integration of these
branches of the literature and the investigation of the effect that the distribution of
education across age groups exerts on economic growth. The results in Lutz et al.
(2008) or Crespo Cuaresma and Mishra (2011) show that income growth differences
across countries and over time can be better predicted if the age dimension of human
capital is incorporated in the modelling framework.
Using a global dataset that spans the last four decades, in this contribution we
estimate econometric models which capture the different aspects of the link between
human capital and income growth highlighted in the literature. We combine such
an estimated model with the projections of population by age, sex and educational
attainment developed by KC and Lutz (2014) for practically all countries of the
world to the year 2100. These population projections, in turn, have been designed
to mimic the different qualitative scenarios (SSPs) which serve as a unifying frame
in order to assess the impacts of climate change and the role played by adaptation
and mitigation policies in counteracting its negative consequences.
The choice of a specification for the aim of projecting income per capita over very
long horizons encounters a trade-off between expanding the model to include the
manifold of factors affecting income and incorporating the uncertainty about the
future trajectories of such determinants over the projection horizon. By concentrat-
ing on human capital dynamics, the model chosen tries to strike a balance between
these two forces. Although the modelling framework employed in the projection
exercise abstracts from some important economic growth determinants, compara-
ble specifications to the one used in this contribution have been often used in the
literature (see Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), Lutz et
al. (2008) or Barro and Lee (2013), just to name a few). The modelling approach
has the advantage of using as an input education-structured population data, whose
persistent dynamics allow for relatively precise and well understood projections.
This contribution is framed in the context of research efforts aimed at providing
economic growth projections for climate research based on the SSP storylines, thus
complementing the reference projections provided by Chateau et al. (2014) for use
in integrated assessment models (see also Leinbach et al. (2014) for an alternative
3
complementary approach based on GDP aggregated at the level of world regions).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric model used
to obtain the projections of GDP per capita. Section 3 summarizes the set of as-
sumptions implied by each one of the SSPs, which define our projection scenarios.
Section 4 presents the results of the income projection exercise, concentrating on
the dynamics of world GDP per capita and the characteristics of each scenario in
terms of the distribution of income per capita across countries. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 The Modelling Framework: Education, Age Struc-
ture and Economic Growth
The income projection model is based on a simple aggregate production function
with heterogeneous labour input, which is differentiated by educational attainment
(no education, primary, secondary and tertiary) and age group (younger and older
workers, defined by a cut-off age of 35 years),
Yit = AitK
α
it
3∏
j=0
2∏
k=1
L
βjk
i,jkt (1)
where Yit is total output in country i at time t, Ait refers to total factor productivity
(TFP), Kit denotes the capital stock and Li,jkt corresponds to the labor input in
age group k (k=1,2 denoting the younger and older age group) with educational
attainment j (from j=0 no education to j=3 some tertiary education level at-
tained). Given the high correlation in the within-country dynamics of educational
attainment by age group, there is a trade-off between using a low aggregation level
in the age dimension and obtaining precise estimates of the model parameters. The
potential multicollinearity problem caused by the co-movement of population by ed-
ucational attainment calls therefore for the use of a small group of age groups in the
specification of the economic growth regressions. The results in Lutz et al. (2008)
indicate that the use of two broad age groups appears sufficient to explain global
economic growth trends once the education dimension is added to the model. Given
the persistence of population dynamics, the results of the estimation and projection
exercise are not strongly affected by changing the age threshold that defines the
older and younger group within the interval (30,45). We also performed a principal
components analysis exercise on the education data by age group which confirmed
that the average level of education and the difference between older and younger
age groups appears sufficient to summarize the variation of each one of the human
capital variables over time and across countries.
Such a specification as the one given by equation (1) implies that the growth rate
of total output depends on the growth rate of each one of the factors of production
(TFP, the capital stock and each one of the population groups by age and educational
attainment level),
∆ log Yit = ∆ logAit + α∆ logKit +
3∑
j=0
2∑
k=1
βjk∆ logLi,jkt. (2)
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In addition, in the spirit of the Nelson-Phelps paradigm (see Nelson and Phelps
(1966) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)), we assume that the growth rate of total
factor productivity depends on three different factors:
(i) the distance to the technology frontier (as approximated by the average in-
come per capita level of the country), which reflects (conditional) income con-
vergence dynamics,
(ii) the stock of human capital in the country (measured as the ratio of population
with different educational attainment levels to total population), which is used
to proxy for the technology innovation potential of the economy and
(iii) the interaction between income per capita and the ratio of population with
different educational attainment levels to total population, which accounts for
technology adoption as a driver of income convergence.
The technology adoption argument suggests that countries which are further away
from the technological frontier profit more than proportionally from investment in
human capital, since an educated labour force accelerates the process of catching
up with technology advancements. In our specification, we employ the approxi-
mation used by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and use income per capita instead
of total factor productivity to define the gap between the current technology level
of an economy and that of the technology frontier. Such a choice can be justified
using different arguments: (a) income per capita and total factor productivity are
highly (positively) correlated (see for example the results in Hall and Jones (1999));
(b) the inclusion of income per capita instead of total factor productivity relates
our model to the large majority of empirical studies aimed at explaining income
growth differences across countries, where conditional convergence is accounted for
by including initial income per capita as an additional explanatory variable; (c) the
qualitative implications of models including total factor productivity instead of in-
come per capita do not differ substantially, as can be seen by comparing the results
in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) to those in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005).
This implies that the specification of the growth rate of total factor productivity in
equation (2) can be written as
∆ logAit = δ log
Yit
Lit
+
3∑
j=1
θj
2∑
k=1
Li,jkt
Lit
+
3∑
j=1
φj log
Yit
Lit
2∑
k=1
Li,jkt
Lit
. (3)
Such a modelling strategy implies that education plays the role of directly increasing
labor productivity through acquired skills (an effect which is related to the fact
that human capital is a direct input of the production function given by equation
(1)) and of enabling the creation and adoption of new technologies (through the
effects summarized in equation (3)), thus increasing economic growth by affecting
the growth rate of total factor productivity. This setting, combining equations (2)
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and (3), leads to an econometric specification which is given by
∆ log Yit = α∆ logKit +
3∑
j=0
2∑
k=1
βjk∆ logLi,jkt + δ log
Yit
Lit
+
+
3∑
j=1
θj
2∑
k=1
Li,jkt
Lit
+
3∑
j=1
φj log
Yit
Lit
2∑
k=1
Li,jkt
Lit
, (4)
where the growth rate of population as well as its composition in terms of age
structure and educational characteristics have an effect of economic growth.
We use data on purchasing power parity adjusted GDP from the Penn World Table
7.0 (Heston et al. (2011)) and construct capital stocks using the perpetual inventory
method making use of investment data from the same source. As in Barro and
Lee (2013), the depreciation rate of 6% was assumed for the computation of the
capital stock series. The IIASA/VID dataset (see Lutz et al. (2007), Lutz et al.
(2008) or KC et al. (2010)) provides (partly reconstructed) historical data on age-
structured educational attainment for most countries in the world and is used as a
source for the human capital variables of the model. The estimates are obtained
using a panel dataset comprising information which spans the period 1970-2010 at
five-year intervals for 120 countries. The variables which are measured in growth
rates refer to the change in the corresponding five-year period, while the variables
measured in levels are evaluated at the first year of the five-year interval, so as to
avoid potential endogeneity problems. In addition to the variables implied by the
production function framework described, we expand our specifications to include
also overall population growth as an extra regressor. The panel structure of the
dataset allows us to include country fixed effects and 5-year period fixed effects in the
specification. The former account for unobserved, time-invariant, country-specific
geographical, institutional or cultural characteristics that affect economic growth,
while the period effects capture global income growth shocks which are common
to all countries in a given 5-year interval. We use robust clustered standard errors
in our estimation to account for potential deviations of the standard assumptions
concerning the behaviour of the error term within countries.
The estimates corresponding to different specifications based on the framework de-
scribed above are presented in Table 1. We start by estimating a specification that
exclusively assesses the convergence dynamics to country-specific balanced growth
paths(see column 1), then we expand the specification by including human capital
accumulation as a driver of income growth, assuming that the effects of education
take place exclusively through its effect on labour productivity (column 2). In col-
umn 3 we include innovation effects in the specification by assuming that the stock
of human capital affects technology and in column 4 we expand this specification
further by including technology adoption effects (through the interaction of income
per capita and the human capital stock). In all specifications the parameter esti-
mates for the growth rate of total population are not significantly different from
unity, which implies that the coefficient estimates for the variables of population by
age and educational attainment level presented in Table 1 can be interpreted as ef-
fects on income per capita. Column 5 presents the estimates of the model including
only the population variables whose parameter estimates are statistically significant
after carrying out general-to-specific model selection based on significance tests for
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individual variables. The negative parameter estimates for initial income and its
interaction with the tertiary education variable indicate that the speed of income
convergence to a country-specific equilibrium depends on the stock of highly edu-
cated workers, thus lending empirical support to the role of education as a catalyst
of technology adoption. This result implies that, for the same level of tertiary edu-
cation, poorer countries benefit more of human capital than richer ones. The speed
of convergence, thus, depends on the stock of human capital and the estimation re-
sults indicate that it is higher for those countries with a more educated population,
as the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis (as interpreted by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994))
would suggest.
The positive and significant parameters attached to the share of working age popula-
tion with secondary and tertiary education are interpreted in the context of Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994) as technology innovation effects. The interaction of age structure
and educational attainment appears relevant in terms of productivity improvements
(summarized in the parameters attached to the growth rate of the respective popu-
lation groups), where growth in the older age group with primary education and the
younger age group with secondary education are particularly relevant in the speci-
fication used. The estimates of this model are used to obtain the projections which
are presented in the following section.
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3 Shared Socio-Economic Pathways: Narratives,
Assumptions and Projections of GDP
O’Neill et al. (2014) and Van Vuuren et al. (2014) present the storylines that frame
the scenarios used as Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs). They differ in terms
of the challenges to mitigation and adaptation which are embodied in their narra-
tives. Each one of the scenarios defined by the SSPs embodies several qualitative
assumptions concerning the overall global economic growth and income convergence
patterns in the projection period. Table 2 presents the qualitative description of
each one of the SSP scenarios based on two dimensions: the growth rate of the
technological frontier and the speed of income convergence across countries.
SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5
Frontier growth Medium Medium Low Medium High
Speed of Income High Medium Low Low Income Countries: Low High
Convergence Medium Income Countries: Medium
High Income Countries: Medium
Table 2: Shared Socio-Economic Pathways: Qualitative GDP growth assumptions
by scenario
Projections of GDP and GDP per capita corresponding to the different SSP scenarios
are obtained by combining assumptions on (a) the dynamics of population by age,
sex and educational attainment, (b) the growth rate of total factor productivity
which is not associated with human capital developments, (c) changes in the country
fixed effects and (d) the behaviour of physical capital accumulation in the projection
period.
Projections of population by age, sex and educational attainment for the different
SSPs can be obtained from KC and Lutz (2014). The contribution by KC and Lutz
(2014) complements the historical information contained in the IIASA/VID dataset
with projections of age-structured population by educational attainment ranging
until 2100. The projection scenarios put forward in KC and Lutz (2014) are based
on the SSP narratives and can thus be directly used in the income projection model
described in this work. Since conceptually the model proposed for GDP projections
is based on the role played by human capital for economic development, the use of
such population projections makes the modelling framework GDP optimal for the
study of the interaction of demographic and economic variables, due to the self-
containedness of the approach. In addition, in the logic of the model proposed to
obtain GDP projections, the characteristics of the income paths implied by the SSPs
presented in Table 2 are expected to be implied (at least partly) by the population
dynamics in the scenarios constructed in KC and Lutz (2014).
The dynamics of total factor productivity embodied in our model are driven, on
the one hand, by improvements in the human capital stock and income convergence
forces (see equation (3)). On the other hand, the fact that our estimated model
contains fixed time effects (in the form of 5-year period dummies) implies that
the specification allows for common global shocks to productivity, which can be
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interpreted as shifts of the global technology frontier which are independent of the
human capital accumulation process. We build assumptions on the future of these
shocks based on the examination of the past estimates of such global productivity
shifts, which are quantified by the parameter estimates corresponding to the period
dummies included in the model.
The specification proposed as a basis for the GDP projections contains country fixed
effects, which are aimed at capturing unobserved country-specific, time-invariant
characteristics of the economies modelled, as well as slow-changing institutional
variables. Alternative scenarios about the behaviour of such fixed effects in the
projection period allow us to recreate income convergence dynamics across countries
which correspond to the different SSPs.
Concerning physical capital accumulation, we assume that the rate of growth of the
capital stock will converge across countries over the coming decades. This hypothesis
is maintained over all SSPs, since our projection exercise concentrates on human
capital accumulation dynamics as a driver of income growth. Other assumptions
concerning the dynamics of physical accumulation can be integrated in the modelling
framework in a straightforward manner and deviations from the scenario settings are
discussed in the robustness session below.
To summarize, we obtain projections for the five SSPs by combining the population
projections for each pathway provided by KC and Lutz (2014) with the calibration
of SSP-specific paths of global technological progress and of cross-country income
convergence speed as implied by the convergence of the estimated fixed effects. Ta-
ble 3 presents the quantitative assumptions used for the projections corresponding
to each SSP. The convergence of fixed effects (“institutional convergence”) is cal-
ibrated by defining the year at which all estimated fixed effects are assumed to
converge to the value of the fixed effect estimated for the US. The growth rate of
capital is assumed to converge to 4% per annum in the year 2100. This value was
obtained as the estimated unconditional expectation of physical capital growth in
a panel autoregressive model using the available historical data and can thus be
loosely interpreted as the common long-run equilibrium in terms of physical capi-
tal accumulation. In particular, using the available data we estimated the model
∆ logKit = ρ0 + ρ1∆ logKit−1 + νit, where νit is assumed to be a white noise dis-
turbance term. The unconditional expectation is obtained as ρˆ0/(1− ρˆ1), where ρˆ0
and ρˆ1 are the corresponding parameter estimates.
Technology frontier growth
(not human capital driven) Institutional convergence by year ...
SSP1 0.35% per year 2180
SSP2 0.3% per year 2250
SSP3 0.3% per year No convergence
SSP4 0.3% per year 2250
SSP5 0.4% per year 2130
Table 3: Shared Socio-Economic Pathways: Assumptions on technology frontier and
institutional convergence by scenario
It should be mentioned that our decision to keep physical accumulation dynamics
identical across scenarios rests upon the observational equivalence of different tra-
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jectories of technology and physical capital accumulation. In our framework, we
can create identical projection paths based on alternative scenarios for capital and
technology (say high growth of the capital stock and low technology growth versus
low growth of the capital stock and high technology growth). As a result, when they
are jointly specified, capital and technology dynamics are not uniquely identified in
the scenarios and can be reinterpreted if some particular capital-to-income ratios
were used to anchor the projections. This exogenous projection settings are thus
in principle jointly defined for both physical capital and technology. In order to
simplify the calibration of the projection, we decided to fix the capital dynamics
across scenarios and base them on the observed global convergence trends of phys-
ical capital growth. This assumption, however, can be relaxed accordingly just by
interpreting part of the dynamics of technology as physical capital changes without
that affecting our results quantitatively.
Using the assumptions described above, GDP and GDP per capita growth projec-
tions were obtained for 144 countries (see Appendix for the list) and all five scenarios.
Some countries - in particular emerging economies - only had available data for one
of the five-year periods in the estimation sample. They were therefore not included
in the estimation but we constructed GDP projections for them, using fixed effects
based on economies with a similar level of economic development. The projected
paths of income growth were further smoothed using a simple moving average filter
centered in the corresponding projection year with a window of 10 years, so as to
avoid sudden jumps in GDP and GDP per capita, in particular at the beginning of
the projection exercise.
4 Income Projections to 2100: An Overview
In this section we give an overview of the main features of the SSP projections and
we concentrate on the dynamics of GDP per capita. The projection data for GDP
and GDP per capita obtained using the methodology proposed in this study can be
retrieved from IIASA’s SSP Database (https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/
ene/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about). We start by assessing the dynam-
ics of world income by scenario and then discuss the cross-country structure of the
projections in terms of income convergence across SSPs.
4.1 World Income Dynamics
Figure 1 presents the average GDP per capita at the world level implied by the five
scenarios, together with historical data ranging back to 1980. In the year 2100, the
scenarios span average world income per capita levels that range between approxi-
mately 20,000 int. $ (basis year 2005) for SSP3 and roughly 100,000 int $ for SSP5.
The aggregated income projections resulting from the exercise imply substantial in-
creases in income per capita for SSP5 and SSP1, while the dynamics of SSP2 are
roughly in line with the historical trend. The SSP3 and SSP4 scenarios result on
stagnating GDP per capita figures from mid-century onwards. The average growth
rate of world income per capita over the full projection period ranges between 0.8%
per year for SSP3 and 2.6% per year in SSP5. Since the specification used implies
11
convergence to country-specific equilibria, this leads to the fact that the projected
rates of increase in GDP per capita for all scenarios are larger in the first part of
the century than in later projection years. The additional convergence dynamics
in terms of educational attainment which are embodied in the population projec-
tions by KC and Lutz (2014), together with the exogenous assumptions on physical
capital accumulation and technology shocks, reinforce such an effect.
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Figure 1: Projections of GDP per capita, world
The importance of human capital dynamics in shaping future income at the world
level can be easily grasped by comparing GDP per capita under the SSP2 and
the SSP4 scenarios. As can be seen in Table 3, both of these scenarios share the
same overarching assumptions in terms of physical capital accumulation, institu-
tional convergence and the growth of technology which is not caused by human
capital accumulation. The average income differences for world GDP per capita be-
tween these scenarios can thus be interpreted as being mostly driven by the effect of
human capital accumulation on labour productivity, innovation and the adoption of
foreign technologies. The SSP4 scenario refers to a world of divergence and strong
inequality both between and within countries, whose human capital dynamics lead
to a polarized distribution of educational attainment on the world by the end of
the 21st century. The inability of poor economies to catch up with industrialized
countries in terms of educational attainment materializes itself in global average
GDP per capita levels which are significantly smaller in this scenario as compared
to SSP2, in spite of the similarity of their assumptions concerning the development
of other economic growth determinants different from human capital.
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High income Middle income Low income
Period World countries countries countries
2010-2040 3.2% 1.7% 4.8% 4.1%
SSP1 2040-2100 1.5% 1.3% 1.5% 2.7%
2010-2100 2.1% 1.4% 2.6% 3.2%
2010-2040 2.8% 1.6% 4.4% 3.1%
SSP2 2040-2100 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% 2.5%
2010-2100 1.7% 1.3% 2.3% 2.7%
2010-2040 1.9% 0.9% 3.9% 1.7%
SSP3 2040-2100 0.3% 1.1% 0.5% 0.7%
2010-2100 0.8% 1.0% 1.6% 1.0%
2010-2040 2.2% 1.6% 3.8% 1.9%
SSP4 2040-2100 0.5% 1.1% 0.5% 1.5%
2010-2100 1.1% 1.3% 1.6% 1.7%
2010-2040 3.5% 1.9% 5.2% 4.6%
SSP5 2040-2100 2.2% 1.7% 2.2% 3.5%
2010-2100 2.6% 1.7% 3.2% 3.9%
Table 4: World GDP per capita: Projected growth rates by income group and by
SSP scenario
4.2 The Cross-Country Dimension of Income Projections
In order to understand the implications of each one of the projection scenarios in
terms of the distribution of income per capita across countries, we start by presenting
in Figure 2 the (between-country) population-weighted Gini coefficient computed for
the projected data corresponding to each SSP.
The degree of inequality in average income per capita across economies decreases
systematically in the scenarios which are dominated by cross-country income con-
vergence trends (SSP1, SSP2 and SSP5). On the other hand, SSP3 and SSP4
present a trend towards more income inequality across economies starting around
2030. Within the convergent scenarios, by the end of the projection horizon the low-
est degree of inequality is obtained in SSP5, which reaches a Gini coefficient value
of roughly 0.25 in 2010. The GDP per capita projections for SSP1 and SSP2 also
lead to significant decreases of inequality across countries over the projection period,
leading to Gini coefficients of 0.33 and 0.41 by 2100, respectively.
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Figure 2: Population-weighted Gini coefficients, by SSP
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In order to assess graphically the changes in the distribution of income across coun-
tries implied by each one of the SSP projections, Figure 3 presents density plots
(beanplots) which depict the distribution of (log) income per capita across projec-
tions in the years 2050 and 2100 for the groups of low income economies, as well as
for that of middle and high-income countries (as of 2013). Beanplots (see Kampstra
(2008)) can be interpreted as density trace plots and have clear advantages as com-
pared to boxplots when it comes to representing graphically data whose distribution
is multi-modal. The vertical lines in Figure 3 depict the means of each distribution,
while the beans correspond to the corresponding density trace for the two subgroups.
The convergence dynamics in income per capita across countries which are embodied
in the SSP1, SSP2 and SSP5 scenarios are clearly recognizable in Figure 3 through
the narrowing of the gap between the mean of two income distributions, together
with the dynamics of the full distributions of income for low, middle and high income
economies. The polarization of the income per capita distribution across countries
in SSP3 and SSP4 is also visible in the density plots for the year 2100.
The different cross-country income convergence patterns in each scenario can be
better understood with the aid of beta-convergence plots. Figure 4 shows, for each
SSP scenario, a scatter plot depicting the level of (log) income per capita in 2010
(in the x-axis) against the cumulative growth of income between 2010 and 2100 (the
log of the ratio of income per capita in 2100 to income in 2010) for each country. A
negative correlation between the two variables indicates that income per capita tends
to equalize across countries (income per capita in poorer economies in 2010 tends to
grow more in the period 2010-2100 on average than in richer economies). The slope of
the relationship relates to the speed of income convergence, with flatter relationships
implying that the income gap across countries tends to persist for longer periods of
time. The robust strong convergent dynamics embodied in the SSP5 and SSP1
scenarios as well as, to a lesser extent, in SSP2, can be seen in the beta-convergence
plots of Figure 4. No significant income convergence across countries is observable
in SSP3, while the weak income convergence structure in the SSP4 scenario is the
result of polarized convergence to several long-run equilibria, as can be inferred from
Figure 3. Such a polarized income per capita distribution in SSP4 emanates from
the heterogeneity in terms of human capital accumulation which is embodied in the
population projections for this scenario (see KC and Lutz (2014)), where the global
high fertility/mortality versus low fertility/mortality divide is assumed to persist
over the projection period. It should be noticed that, as opposed to the Gini indices
presented in Figure 2, the observations in Figure 4 are not weighted by population.
Cross-country convergence in mean income can thus be accompanied by increasing
inequality once that population weights are added to the analysis, as is the case in
our results for SSP4.
4.3 Selected Robustness Checks
Given the large number of alternative parameter calibration choices in the projec-
tion exercise, we performed a battery of robustness checks by changing the assump-
tions corresponding to the different scenarios. The interpretation of the scenario
parametrization presented above, for instance, leads in some cases to very large
changes in capital-to-output ratios over the projection horizon. The intuition be-
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Figure 4: Projected growth in income (2010-2100) against (log) initial income, 2010
17
hind the narratives of our projection scenarios is based on the existence of a balanced
growth path for physical capital stocks sustained empirically by the historical expe-
rience in our sample of countries (that is, based on the convergence path observed
in the data for physical capital accumulation). Alternatively, we also obtained sim-
ulations using within-country convergence of capital-to-output ratios as the relevant
property for physical capital scenarios. In particular, we set the growth rate of the
physical capital stock in period t of the projection period equal to the growth rate
of GDP in period t− 1, so that in the long-run equilibrium the capital-to-output is
constant. Such a change in the projection scenarios leads to a decrease in income
per capita over the projection period but does not change the qualitative conclu-
sions of the analysis. On average across all countries in the sample, this alternative
assumption reduces GDP per capita in 2100 by 15% (standard deviation: 7.4%) in
SSP1 and by 15.5% (standard deviation: 5.9%) in SSP3, for instance, as compared
to our original projections. Detailed results of this alternative projection setting are
available from the author upon request.
The nonlinear role that education plays on economic growth through its effect on
technology adoption implies that it is not straightforward to decompose the effects of
each one of the factors of production on long-run economic growth, as it would be the
case in standard growth accounting exercises for the log-linear production function
case. The importance of human capital dynamics in our scenarios can be grasped by
performing counterfactual scenarios where the assumptions concerning educational
attainment in a given SSP are imposed in a different one. Imposing the human
capital dynamics of SSP3 on the SSP2 setting, for instance, leads to an average
decrease in income per capita in 2100 of roughly 78% for low income economies
(as implied by the log difference in GDP per capita, with a standard deviation of
27.9%. This robustness check implies replacing human capital projections based
on the so called Global Education Trend (GET) scenario with education dynamics
which build on the assumption of constant enrolment rates (CER scenario, see KC
and Lutz, 2014).
5 Conclusions
Projections of GDP and GDP per capita are important inputs for integrated as-
sessment models aimed at measuring the effects of climate change. We propose to
create such income scenarios by combining population projections by age, sex and
educational attainment which have been developed in the context of recent scenario-
building efforts for climate change research with a simple estimated economic growth
model based on human capital dynamics. This modelling structure has the advan-
tage of providing an internally consistent framework to simulate GDP per capita
paths which correspond to the narratives put forward in the framework of the re-
cently developed Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (see O’Neill et al. (2014) and Van
Vuuren et al. (2014)).
This contribution is the first one, to our knowledge, to propose an econometric tool
aimed at long-run income projection for climate change research which stresses the
role of human capital dynamics. As such, several efforts to improve the modelling
framework further and account for some of the potential weaknesses of the approach
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need to be carried out in the future. While the focus of the projection methodology
on human capital dynamics lends parsimony to the approach, for many applications
such a simplification may appear too far-fetched. This is particularly the case if trend
breaks or disruptive short-lived events need to be accounted for in the projection
period. Further research integrating a more systematic assessment of physical capital
dynamics and institutional change should be able to expand the range of applications
of this income projection tool.
The model put forward lends itself to applications beyond climate change research
and provides a basis for further scenario-building exercises. The simplicity and
flexibility of the specification used makes the method particularly attractive to assess
research questions related to the macroeconomic behaviour of countries in the very
long run when human capital dynamics are the core of the analysis.
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Appendix
Fixed effect estimates
The fixed effects of the estimated model are interpreted as the effect of (partly
unobservable) time-invariant country-specific characteristics on economic growth.
These include geographical, institutional and cultural factors. The different scenarios
used in the projection exercise imply different dynamics of such effects over the
projection period. In addition, the period fixed effects included in the model account
for global economic growth shocks to all countries in the sample.
The estimated country fixed effects for the sample based on the period 1970-2010
are presented in Figure A.1 below and the period fixed effects in Figure A.2.
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Figure A.1: Country fixed effect estimates
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Figure A.2: Period fixed effect estimates
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Countries in the Projection Exercise
Africa America Asia Europe Oceania
Algeria Argentina Bahrain Austria Australia
Benin Bahamas Bangladesh Belgium Fiji
Botswana Barbados Bhutan Bulgaria New Zealand
Burkina Faso Belize Brunei Denmark Papua New Guinea
Burundi Bolivia Cambodia Finland Samoa
Cameroon Brazil China France Solomon Islands
Cape Verde Canada Cyprus Germany Tonga
Central African Republic Chile Hong Kong Greece Vanuatu
Chad Colombia India Hungary
Comoros Costa Rica Indonesia Iceland
Congo Cuba Iran Ireland
Dem. Rep. Of Congo Dominican Republic Iraq Italy
Cte d’Ivoire Ecuador Israel Luxembourg
Djibouti El Salvador Japan Malta
Egypt Grenada Jordan Netherlands
Equatorial Guinea Guatemala Korea Norway
Ethiopia Guyana Lao Poland
Gabon Haiti Lebanon Portugal
Gambia Honduras Malaysia Romania
Ghana Jamaica Maldives Spain
Guinea Mexico Mongolia Sweden
Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Nepal Switzerland
Kenya Panama Oman United Kingdom
Lesotho Paraguay Pakistan
Liberia Peru Philippines
Madagascar Puerto Rico Singapore
Malawi Saint Lucia Sri Lanka
Mali St Vincent and the Grenadines Syria
Mauritania Suriname Thailand
Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago Turkey
Morocco United States Vietnam
Mozambique Uruguay
Namibia Venezuela
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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